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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Canadian and Australian
banking systems have been singled out by some commentators as having performed better
than many other banking systems, particularly those in Europe, America and the United
Kingdom. Banks in both Canada and Australia, for instance, have continued to report
enviable earnings, sound capital levels, and high credit ratings both before and during the
GFC. The G-20 and the European Union have tried to identify the features of the Canadian
and Australian financial systems which have underpinned this success in order to use them
in shaping a revised international regulatory framework. One area of focus has been the
regulations governing “quality of capital”.
Despite these apparent successes, there is some evidence that both Canadian and
Australian banks experienced considerable deterioration in the market value of their assets
during the GFC. In this paper we use the KMV / Merton structural methodology, which
incorporates market asset values, to examine default probabilities of 9 listed Canadian
banks and 13 Australian listed banks in both a pre-GFC period (2000-2006) and a GFC
period (2007-2008). We also modify the model to incorporate conditional probability of
default which measures extreme credit risk.
This paper finds that bank risk was significantly similar for Australian and Canadian
Banks during the GFC period. This includes an assessment of impaired assets, Value at
Risk (VaR) and Distance to Default (DD), as well as the extreme measures of Conditional
VaR (CVaR), and Conditional Distance to Default (CDD); metrics which confirm the two
countries similarities in terms of a significant increase in credit risk between pre-GFC and
GFC periods. The extent of this increase was, however, far more pronounced for Australia,
which was coming off a lower base. Bank risk for both countries was found to be far lower
than for global counterparts due to factors such as sound regulatory control and low levels
of involvement in sub-prime lending. This could provide lessons for global banks on risk
management. A key conclusion of the paper is that it is important that fluctuating market
values, especially the extreme fluctuations which are measured by CVaR and CDD, are a
key consideration when determining risk management criteria such as capital adequacy.

Keywords: Value at risk; Conditional value at risk; Distance to default; Probability of
default; Conditional distance to default; Conditional probability of default.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Canada and Australia share a number of similar characteristics. Importantly, both were
colonies in the British Empire and this has impacted on the characteristics that each has
developed. In particular, they share a common head of state. In addition, both countries
have a similar geography that involves relatively small populations concentrated in a few
large cities; large areas of each continent relatively uninhabited; and an endowment of
mineral wealth. But there are, of course, differences. One is the difference of their
respective locations: one in the northern hemisphere and the other in the southern
hemisphere with a very large distance separating them. A second difference that flows on
from this is the increasingly Asian orientation of Australia as against Canada’s
unavoidable orientation to the US. A third difference is the French influence in Canada,
which is without parallel in Australia.
The popular press contains many references to how the two countries are similar
(E.g.,Sales (2003)). Academic research has also identified similarities as well as
differences in a number of different contexts (E.g.,Brooks (2009)). In addition, there have
been fora such as the 2010 Australia Canada Economic Leadership Forum (Canadian
Australian Chamber of Commerce, 2010) which have looked to develop the synergies
between the two countries.
Possibly, the most recent, systematic, and comprehensive comparison of the two countries
is by MacMillan & McKenzie (2002) who examine how trade, aviation, military,
constitutional, imperial, and diplomatic relations between Canada and Australia have
changed during the twentieth century. They conclude that similarities between the two
countries have underpinned the cooperation and cordiality that is a feature of the
relationship.
With the occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a new area of similarity
between the two countries has emerged: “the relative resilience of our banking sectors”
(Stevens, 2009). In this speech, RBA Governor Stevens highlights the profitable and well
capitalised status of Canadian and Australian banks following the GFC. He attributes this
to two main factors: the relatively modest holdings of complex securities which were at the
centre of the crisis; and the more conservative lending practices by banks in their home
markets. In his concluding remarks, Stevens (2009) notes that, relative to the US, UK and
European experience, the two countries financial and regulatory systems have “performed
pretty well … and … are largely free of serious problems” (Stevens, 2009, p. 10).
Dickinson (2010a) produces a detailed comparison of Canadian and Australian banks
following the GFC in order to better understand why they had performed relatively so
well. He identifies a number of factors, including the past conservatism of Canadian and
Australian regulatory requirements regarding capital adequacy; the lack of compromised
lending standards; and a focus on domestic lending (Dickinson, 2010b). Ratnovski and
Huang (2009) undertake similar analysis, but only focus on Canadian banks and their
balance sheets. They identify similar factors to those identified by Dickinson (2010b): the
capital regulations which reduced Canadian banks’ desire to take risks; and ample retail
and depository funding. The benefit of strong bank regulation in Canada and Australia is a
sentiment also echoed by Smith (2010). Dickinson (2010a) notes that both the European
Union and the G-20 are looking to modify their banking regulations in the light of the
Canadian and Australian experience.
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Given this promotion of Canada and Australia as exemplars of bank regulation in the time
of a GFC, the current research aims to take a different perspective from the previous
research by investigating how well banks in these two countries performed from the
viewpoint of market values. The techniques of Value at Risk (VaR) and Distance to
Default (DD), as well as the extreme measures of Conditional VaR (CVaR), and
Conditional Distance to Default (CDD) are used here. The next section of the paper
provides background information on the banking industry in Australia and Canada. Section
2 deals with data and methodology. Section 3 covers the results and discussion, with
conclusions provided in Section 4.
1.1. The Banking Industry in Australia and Canada
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) regulates all Authorised Deposittaking Institutions (ADI’s) in Australia. As per statistics from APRA (2009) and the RBA
(2009a), ADI’s comprise 58 banks, 11 building societies, and 129 credit unions. Of the
58 banks, 13 are Australian owned comprising 88 % of total bank assets). The remainder
are subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks comprising 12 % of total bank assets). The
industry is dominated by the four major banks, which comprise approximately 75 % of
ADI’s total assets. These banks include Westpac, the Australia and New Zealand Banking
Corporation (ANZ), the National Australia Bank (NAB), and the Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (CBA). These figures include the assets of St. George Bank and the Bank of
Western Australia (BankWest) who have recently merged with Westpac and CBA
respectively.
The Canadian Bank regulator is the Office of the Canadian Superintendent of Financial
Institutions (OSFI). Figures provided by the OSFI (2009) show Canada has a total of 78
banks with assets totalling USD $3 trillion. 22 of these are domestic banks, with the others
being primarily branches of foreign banks. Of the 22 domestic banks, 9 are public
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The ‘Big 5’ banks (Royal Bank of
Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, and Canadian
Imperial Bank) have total assets of USD $2.4 trillion, approximately 80% of the total
Canadian domestic banking market.
Table 1 shows Australian and Canadian banks continue to grow total assets at a similar
rate over the GFC period. Total assets in Australian banks doubled over the past 5 years, a
slightly higher growth rate than for Canada, whereas impaired assets showed a fivefold
increase. However, because this is off a low base of 0.19%, the peak of 0.95% is very low
in comparison to international standards. Canadian banks more than doubled their increase
in impaired assets from 0.4% to 0.9%. This is a much smaller increase than Australia, but
off a higher base. Indeed, Canada’s impaired assets, whilst increasing during the GFC, are
at lower levels than those of the early 2000’s following the tech-stock crash and the
terrorist attacks in the US. In comparison to Australia and Canada, the US (Federal
Reserve Bank, 2009) and UK (Bank of England, 2009) showed delinquency rates more
than trebling from 2007 to 2009 from 2.4% to 8.8% and from 2.1% to 6.6% respectively.

2

Table 1. Key Growth and Risk Indicators for Australian Banks

Mar-2000
Mar-2001
Mar-2002
Mar-2003
Mar-2004
Mar-2005
Mar-2006
Mar-2007
Mar-2008
Mar-2009

Australia
Total
assets
Impaired
($bn)
assets (%)
989
0.6
1,176
0.6
1,153
0.7
1,216
0.6
1,396
0.4
1,536
0.3
1,764
0.2
2,016
0.2
2,463
0.3
2,694
1.0

Canada
Total
assets
Impaired
($bn)
assets (%)
1,431
1.1
1,577
1.4
1,651
1.6
1,703
1.6
1,754
1.1
1,877
0.6
2,083
0.5
2,375
0.4
2,727
0.5
3,021
0.9

Figures are calculated from RBA Statistics (2009b) for all banks operating in Australia. Building Societies
and Credit Unions are not included. Impaired assets refer to non-accrual assets and restructured assets both
on- and off-balance sheet, plus any assets acquired through the enforcement of security conditions. Nonaccrual assets have income which may no longer be accrued ahead of its receipt because there is doubt about
the ultimate collectability of principal and/or interest. Restructured assets have been modified to provide for
concessions of interest or principal exposures. Impaired assets for Canada are calculated as impaired loans
and advances as presented in the financial statements compared to total loans and advances as presented on
the face of the balance sheet. Impaired assets for Canada follow a similar definition to those for Australia.
Canadian total assets and impaired assets are for all banks classified as domestic as obtained from the OSFI
(2009). Figures were either taken at the quarterly reporting date shown in column 1 or the closest reporting
date to it. For comparison purposes, amounts are all in USD.

Tier 1 and total capital ratios for both countries in Table 2 are well above the regulatory
requirements of 4% and 8% respectively. Total equity ratio (shareholders funds to total
assets) is substantially lower than the total capital ratio for both countries, in line with their
high housing loan component which attracts a lower risk weighting than commercial
borrowers. The equity ratio of just over 6% for Australian banks in 2008 is slightly higher
than the 5.2% for Canadian banks, with both countries being substantially higher than the
collective ratio of 3.5% for European banks, but somewhat lower than in the 7.1% for the
US. Equity ratios in all cases are calculated as total shareholder equity / total assets as
obtained from Datastream. The differential of approximately 3% between risk-weighted
and absolute capital ratios for Australia is lower than Canada, with Canada’s differential of
6% being similar to other global regions. In Australia, APRA has generally taken a
conservative approach to risk weighting assets, for example, applying a higher risk
weighting to higher risk non-standard home loans.
Table 2. Capital and Equity Ratios 2008

Tier 1 Capital (%) Total Capital (%)
Australia
8.4
11.4
Canada
11.8
14.5

Equity Ratio (%)
6.2
5.2

Figures for both countries are taken at quarterly reporting date March 2009, or closest reporting date to it.
Tier 1 and Total Capital figures are as reported by the banks in accordance with Basel requirements.
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Overall, this section has shown that whilst there have been substantial increases in
Australian and Canadian bank impaired assets, levels are modest in comparison to other
major global areas.
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We include all 13 Australian listed banks and 9 listed Canadian banks. For Australia this
includes the 4 major banks and 9 smaller / regional banks (88% of total bank assets in
Australia). In Canada this includes the ‘big 5’ and 4 smaller banks (over 80% of total bank
assets in Canada). All data is obtained from Datastream, including 10 years of daily equity
prices for each bank, together with required balance sheet data for calculating VaR, CVaR,
DD and PD as described below. This includes daily market capitalisation (used in
calculation of daily asset values and for weighting banks to calculate VaR and CVaR); and
annual total liabilities, current liabilities and long term liabilities (used in calculation of
DD). We compare trends for each of the 10 years, as well as dividing data into a pre-GFC
period and a GFC period. The GFC period is from 2007-2008 and the pre-GFC period is
the 7 years from 2000 – 2006 (7 years aligns with Basel Accord Advanced Credit Risk
Requirements). We use an F test to compare share price and market asset volatility
between the two countries, testing for significance at both the 95% and 99% levels.
2.1. VaR , CVaR, DD and CDD Methodology
Value at Risk (VaR) is widely used for measuring market risk, with Conditional VaR
(CVaR) providing a measurement for extreme risk. VaR’s use by banks escalated since
adoption by Basel of VaR as the primary measure for calculating market risk capital
requirements. The metric measures potential losses over a specific time period at a given
level of confidence. There is extensive literature coverage on VaR. Examples include
RiskMetricsTM (1994, 1996) who introduced and popularised VaR, Jorion (1996), and
comprehensive discussion of VaR by more than seventy recognised authors in the VaR
Modelling Handbook and the VaR Implementation Handbook (2009a, 2009b). In
summary, there are 3 methods applied for calculating VaR. The Variance-Covariance
(parametric) method introduced by RiskMetrics is the most widely used method by Banks
and is the method we use in this study. It estimates VaR on the assumption of a normal
distribution. To obtain VaR for a single asset X, all that needs to be calculated is the mean
and standard deviation (ơ). Using standard distribution tables, and given the normal curve
assumption, we automatically know where the worst 1% and 5% lie on the curve: 95%
confidence = -1.645ơx and 99% confidence = -2.330ơx. When calculating VaR, it is usual
practice, as used by RiskMetrics, to not use actual asset figures, but rather the logarithm of
the ratio of price relatives. That is, the ratio between today’s price and the previous price.
A key criticism of VaR is that it says nothing of risk beyond VaR. Critics include
Standard and Poor’s analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) due to inconsistency of
VaR application across institutions and lack of tail risk assessment. Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber, & Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have undesirable mathematical properties, such
as lack of sub-additivity. Criticism of VaR mounted since the GFC onset with VaR
perceived as focussing on historical risk and not measuring tail risk. In addition to VaR,
this paper examines CVaR which considers losses beyond VaR. If VaR is calculated at
95%, CVaR is the average of the 5% extreme returns. Pflug (2000) showed CVaR to be a
coherent measure, without the undesirable VaR properties. CVaR has been used in an
Australian setting by Allen and Powell (2007), who find significant correlation between
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VaR and CVaR in ranking risk among Australian sectors prior to the GFC and Powell and
Allen (2009) who use CVaR to show how relative risk changed among sectors since the
GFC onset.
As we are examining VaR and CVaR of equities, we weight each bank according to
market capitalisation. Correlation among assets in the portfolio is not calculated as we are
not calculating VaR for investment purposes, and do not need to show the effect of
portfolio diversification. Our total bank figures are based on a weighted average of the
underlying bank VaRs. The weighted average is a more meaningful figure to compare
individual banks against. VaR is usually measured at high confidence levels, either 95% or
99%, with CVaR measured as the returns beyond VaR (5% or 1%). As the GFC period
includes only 2 years with approximately 250 daily returns (based on the number of
trading days), for a confidence level of 99%, CVaR would only encompass 2.5 returns for
each of the 2 years, giving 5 returns in total for each bank. We have thus chosen CVaR at
5% (VaR 95%), which provides analysis of a reasonable number of extreme returns.
Share price market risk, which we use VaR and CVaR to measure, is, in turn, a key
component of asset price fluctuations which are important to measuring distance to default
(DD) and probability of default (PD) using the Merton structural methodology. The firm
defaults when asset values fall below debt levels. DD is calculated as:
DD 

ln(V / F )  (  0.5 v2 )T

v T

(1)

Where V is the market value of the firm, F = face value of firm’s debt, and µ = an estimate
of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets. PD can be determined using the normal
distribution. For example, if DD = 2 standard deviations, we know there is a 95%
probability that assets will vary between 1 and two standard deviations. There is a 2.5%
probability that they will fall by more than 2 standard deviations. Using N as the
cumulative standard normal distribution function, PD is measured as:
PD  N (  DD )

(2)

Moody’s KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) is a popular model used by banks to measure PD.
KMV calculates DD based on the Merton approach, but instead of using a normal
distribution to calculate PD, KMV use their own worldwide database to determine PD
associated with each default level. In KMV, debt is taken as the value of all short-term
liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all long term debt outstanding,
and this is the approach we use in this study. T is usually set as 1 year. Using equity
returns and the relationship between equity and assets, we estimate an initial asset return.
Daily log return is calculated and new asset values estimated for every day. Following
KMV, this is repeated until asset returns converge.
Allen and Powell (2009) have modified the Merton model to incorporate a CVaR approach
due to the fact that firm’s are most likely to default under extreme circumstances. We use
this approach, whereby instead of using the standard deviation of all asset returns, we use
the standard deviation of the worst 5% of returns (which we call CStdev) to calculate
Conditional Distance to Default (CDD) and conditional Probability of Default (default
conditional upon asset values fluctuating at the extreme 5% level):
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CDD 

ln(V / F )  (   0.5 v2 )T
CStdevv T

CPD  N ( CDD )

(3)
(4)

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 1 compares yearly VaR, CVaR, DD and CDD between Australian and Canadian
Banks using 3 point polynomial trend lines, with metrics calculated as explained in the
methodology section. The graphs show risk reducing during the mid-2000’s and increasing
sharply over the GFC period. Canada’s graphs are flatter, having higher risk than Australia
earlier on and most noticeably with CDD, and slightly lower on all measures during the
GFC. The higher risk measures for Canada during the early 2000’s are attributable to
several factors. In particular, due to high reliance on the US economy, Canada’s markets
during this early pre-GFC period mirrored US markets to a large extent. First, global share
markets entered a much anticipated cool-off following a period of very high growth during
the 1990s. Second, the US Federal Reserve Bank and many other Central Banks made
several interest rate increases to cool spending and inflation. Third, the dot-com bubble
burst in March 2000, sending high tech stocks tumbling. Fourth, the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 caused further market decline. Canada experienced problems such as
high unemployment and volatility in the telecommunications and technology sectors in the
early 2000’s. It was only after 2003 that markets entered a period of sustained growth,
which continued up until the start of the GFC. This period of growth and stability is
reflected in lower VaR and CVaR values in the mid-2000’s. Using F tests to compare
volatility in equity and assets between the two countries, we find that differences in all
four volatility measures (VaR, CVaR, Stdev and CStdev) are significant at the 99% level
pre-GFC, but are not significant at either the 99% or 95% level during the GFC. That is,
they had similar levels of risk during the GFC.
Despite Australian and Canadian banks performing better than many global areas, our
study shows large increases in bad debts and equity/asset fluctuations, particularly in
Australia. There are several factors contributing to this. The fallout in global financial
markets, particularly in the US and Europe, and the failure of major banks such as Lehman
Brothers and Northern Rock, sparked fears of contagion to all global markets.
Additionally, wholesale and securitisation markets dried up, making it extremely difficult
for banks to obtain funding. This was exacerbated by market conditions being very poor
for raising capital, and by market fears of rising unemployment and increasing corporate
failures affecting loan repayments.
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Figure 1 Polynomial trend comparison of Australian and Canadian banks using
VaR, CVar, DD, and CDD

4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows how bank risk was significantly similar for Australian and Canadian
Banks during the GFC period. This includes an assessment of impaired assets, VaR, and
DD; as well the extreme measures of CVaR, and CDD. These metrics collectively confirm
the similarities between these two countries: both countries showed a significant increase
in credit risk between pre-GFC and GFC periods, but the extent of this increase was far
more pronounced for Australia which came off a lower base. These increases highlight the
importance of factoring market fluctuations, as measured by the metrics used in this paper,
into risk management criteria such as capital and provisions. Despite these fluctuations,
bank risk for both countries was far lower than for global counterparts due to factors such
as sound regulatory control and low levels of involvement in sub-prime lending, which
provides lessons for global banks on risk management.
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